

When AI makes execution free, what determines survival? The Last Moat reveals why traditional advantages collapse and what replaces them: distribution architecture, control over how demand finds supply.

The Last Moat:

Why Distribution Is the Only Moat When Execution Becomes Infinite

By Nick Eubanks

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
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Chapter 1:
The Product Didn't Fail

The printing presses started rolling at 2 AM.

In the pre-dawn darkness of newsrooms across America throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the mechanical symphony of offset printing shook buildings with industrial certainty. Massive rolls of newsprint fed through cylinders at speeds that would have seemed impossible just decades earlier. By sunrise, bundles of fresh newspapers sat on loading docks, ready for distribution routes that had been optimized over generations.

The economics were straightforward and extraordinarily profitable. In 1990, the newspaper industry in the United States generated more than $60 billion in annual revenue—roughly $140 billion in today's dollars. The structure that produced this river of money was elegantly simple: newspapers aggregated attention at scale, then sold access to that attention. Advertisers paid premium rates because they had no alternatives. If you wanted to reach the households in Cleveland, you advertised in the *Plain Dealer*. If you wanted to reach Boston, you bought space in the *Globe*.

The barriers to entry were massive and obvious. A printing press cost millions. Distribution networks required fleets of trucks and an army of carriers who knew every neighborhood route. Newsrooms needed experienced journalists, editors, photographers, and typesetters. The capital intensity alone kept competitors at bay. In city after city, a single dominant paper controlled the majority of local information flow and captured the economic surplus that came with monopoly position.

It felt permanent because it had been permanent for so long. Newspaper dynasties passed through generations. Families built fortunes on ink and paper. The classified section alone—three-line ads

for used cars, apartment rentals, job openings—generated billions in nearly pure-profit revenue. The business model was so stable that it became invisible, like gravity.

Then the internet arrived, and something strange happened.

Or rather, something strange *didn't* happen.

The internet did not immediately destroy newspapers. In the mid-1990s, most publishers treated their websites as experimental appendages to the real business. Early web traffic was modest. Online advertising barely registered. Classified ads continued flowing to print. Retail advertisers kept buying full-page spreads for weekend sales. Revenue kept growing.

The product—journalism itself—remained strong. If anything, newsrooms were producing more ambitious work than ever. Investigative reporting won Pulitzers. Foreign bureaus expanded. The craft improved even as the business model began its slow, nearly imperceptible erosion.

What changed was not the product. What changed was where the coordination happened.

In 1995, a former software engineer named Craig Newmark started an email distribution list for events in San Francisco. It was basic, almost primitive: plain text, no graphics, purely functional. By 1996, it had evolved into a website called Craigslist. The site did something newspapers had been doing for over a century—it connected people who wanted to sell things with people who wanted to buy them. But it did this with almost no friction and almost no cost.

Craigslist didn't produce journalism. It didn't operate printing presses. It didn't employ reporters or maintain distribution networks. It simply coordinated buyers and sellers more efficiently than newspaper classified sections ever could. And in doing so, it quietly began

dismantling a revenue stream that had subsidized American journalism for generations.

The mediation layer moved.

Advertising didn't disappear—it followed attention to where coordination was most efficient. Between 2000 and 2020, U.S. newspaper advertising revenue fell by more than 70 percent, from roughly $65 billion to less than $20 billion. Entire regional papers closed their doors. Newsrooms that once employed hundreds of journalists shrunk to dozens, then to skeletons. Ownership consolidated desperately or simply gave up.

The standard explanation for this collapse became a kind of industry liturgy: newspapers failed to adapt to the digital age. They were too slow, too bureaucratic, too wedded to the old ways. They didn't "get" the internet. They failed to innovate.

This explanation is psychologically satisfying but economically incomplete.

Many newspapers did launch websites early. The *New York Times* went online in 1996. Major metropolitan papers invested millions in digital infrastructure. They experimented with subscription models, paywalls, social media integration, video journalism, and data visualization. Adaptation was not absent. What was absent was control over the distribution system.

The fundamental shift was architectural, not operational. Search engines like Google began mediating how people discovered information. Social networks like Facebook determined what news appeared in feeds and reached audiences. Online marketplaces like Craigslist and eBay coordinated classified transactions. Advertising exchanges automated the buying and selling of ad inventory, driving down prices through programmatic efficiency.

Newspapers went from being vertically integrated producers and distributors—controlling everything from reporting to printing to delivery—to being content producers operating inside someone else's distribution system. They still made the product. They no longer controlled how it reached consumers or how it was monetized.

The product did not fail first. Distribution did.

And this pattern—this specific sequence of events where production remains viable but distribution governance shifts—did not begin with newspapers, and it certainly didn't end there.

The Railroad Pattern

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, before national markets existed in any meaningful sense, American manufacturers served primarily local and regional demand. A textile mill in Massachusetts sold to buyers within a few hundred miles. A steel foundry in Pennsylvania supplied construction projects it could reach by wagon. The constraint wasn't production capacity—industrialization was rapidly expanding what could be manufactured. The constraint was geography.

Transportation was expensive and slow. Moving goods long distances over poor roads required time, labor, and often multiple intermediaries. Production was geographically constrained not by choice but by the brutal economics of friction.

The railroad changed this equation with mathematical precision.

Between 1860 and 1890, railroad mileage in the United States exploded from roughly 30,000 miles to more than 160,000 miles. Rail lines connected agricultural regions to urban markets, coal mines to factories, factories to ports. Freight costs plummeted. Transit times compressed from weeks to days. Markets that had been fragmented

by distance began to integrate into something resembling a national economy.

On the surface, this appeared to be an unqualified victory for producers. Suddenly, a manufacturer in Chicago could compete in markets across the Midwest and beyond. Production volumes increased. Economies of scale kicked in. Prices fell as efficiency improved.

But something else happened alongside this expansion, something less visible but ultimately more important: power migrated to those who controlled the routes.

The railroads did not produce wheat, steel, or textiles. They produced coordination. They made it possible for goods to move efficiently across space. And because they controlled this coordination function, they gained leverage over the producers who depended on their lines.

Railroad operators could offer preferential pricing to large-volume shippers, squeezing out smaller competitors. They could set rate structures that advantaged certain industries or regions over others. They could expand lines into some areas while bypassing others entirely, effectively determining which towns would prosper and which would wither. Small manufacturers who needed access to distant markets found themselves negotiating with entities that had structural leverage they could not match.

Production expanded *because* distribution compressed. But control migrated upward to those who coordinated movement, not to those who made things.

Standard Oil and the Control of Flow

The pattern intensified in the oil industry, where John D. Rockefeller built the most dominant American enterprise of the late nineteenth

century not primarily through better refining, but through better coordination.

In the decades following the first major oil discovery in Pennsylvania in 1859, oil production surged. Drilling techniques improved. Refining capacity expanded. Demand for kerosene—used for lighting before electricity became widespread—created a massive market. The basic production technology was available to many competitors. Dozens of refineries operated across Ohio, Pennsylvania, and other oil-producing regions.

Rockefeller's Standard Oil succeeded not by refining petroleum more efficiently than everyone else, though it did refine efficiently. It succeeded by controlling how oil moved from wells to refineries to consumers.

Standard Oil negotiated exclusive transportation agreements with railroads, securing rates that competitors could not access. More importantly, it invested heavily in pipeline infrastructure—a distribution technology that reduced reliance on railroads entirely. Pipelines moved oil continuously, cheaply, and reliably. By the 1880s, Standard Oil controlled roughly 90 percent of the refined oil market in the United States, not because its refineries were ten times better, but because it controlled the infrastructure that determined which refineries could operate profitably.

The lesson was architectural: control distribution, and production becomes subordinate. Producers who could not access pipelines at favorable rates faced structural disadvantage. They might refine oil competently, but if they couldn't move it economically, competence was irrelevant.

The product of oil did not change fundamentally during this period. What changed was who controlled the coordination layer between production and demand. Rockefeller understood that the real power lay in controlling flow, not in controlling individual refineries. Standard

Oil became a distribution empire that happened to refine oil, rather than a refining company that happened to distribute.

When the federal government eventually broke up Standard Oil in 1911 under antitrust law, it wasn't breaking up a production monopoly. It was breaking up a coordination monopoly.

Broadcast Networks and the Scarcity of Airtime

The twentieth century brought new coordination layers, and the pattern repeated with remarkable consistency.

When commercial radio emerged in the 1920s, content producers proliferated rapidly. Local stations experimented with news, music, drama, and comedy. Anyone with modest capital could theoretically operate a station. The Federal Radio Act of 1927 established licensing, but hundreds of stations received authorization. Production of radio content was relatively abundant and diverse.

What was scarce was not content. It was reach.

National broadcast networks—NBC, CBS, and later ABC—emerged to solve a coordination problem. They aggregated audiences across the country by distributing content through affiliate stations in hundreds of markets simultaneously. Instead of advertisers negotiating individually with hundreds of local stations, they could purchase national reach through a single contract with a network.

For audiences, networks provided consistent programming at scale. For advertisers, networks provided efficient access to millions of listeners. For content producers, networks provided the only realistic path to mass distribution.

The quid pro quo was obvious: studios and producers competed for inclusion in network schedules. The networks curated what aired and when. They controlled which shows received promotional support,

which time slots were allocated to which programs, and how advertising inventory was priced. Placement determined exposure. Exposure determined survival.

A producer might create brilliant radio drama or comedy. But without network distribution, that content reached only local audiences. The product could be excellent. The distribution determined whether it mattered.

Television repeated this pattern on a larger scale. As TV displaced radio in the 1950s and 1960s, the number of national networks remained constrained by spectrum limitations and regulatory structure. ABC, CBS, and NBC dominated. Content production flourished—studios produced game shows, sitcoms, westerns, variety programs, news broadcasts. Competition was fierce at the production layer.

But airtime was scarce. Prime-time slots were limited. Networks wielded extraordinary power. They commissioned shows, shaped formats, determined cancellations, and extracted the majority of advertising revenue. Producers operated beneath the coordination layer, not above it.

This wasn't exploitation, exactly. It was structural. When distribution capacity is constrained and production capacity is abundant, leverage flows to the distributor. Networks provided genuine value by solving coordination problems. But they also captured economic rent because they controlled access.

Retail Distribution and Shelf Space as Governance

The retail sector demonstrated the same principle through a different mechanism.

As national retail chains expanded in the twentieth century—companies like Sears, Walmart, and later Target—they aggregated

demand in ways that individual local stores could not. A manufacturer who secured shelf space at Walmart gained access to millions of customers across hundreds of locations. The efficiency was extraordinary.

But shelf space was finite. Store layout was strategic. The products placed at eye level in high-traffic aisles received disproportionate attention. End-cap displays drove sales spikes. Buyers at retail headquarters negotiated purchase volumes, pricing terms, and promotional schedules. They decided which brands appeared and which didn't.

Manufacturers competed fiercely at the production layer—improving quality, reducing costs, differentiating features. But their access to consumers was mediated by retail buyers. Those buyers controlled the coordination layer between production and demand.

Brands that built direct distribution channels—through catalogs, brand stores, or later, e-commerce—retained more leverage. They could negotiate with retailers as partners rather than supplicants. Brands that relied exclusively on retail shelf space found themselves negotiating from positions of structural weakness.

Production quality mattered. Distribution governance determined economics.

The Structural Pattern

When you step back from individual industries and examine the pattern across railroad networks, oil pipelines, broadcast systems, and retail distribution, the sequence repeats with predictable consistency:

1. **Production becomes easier or more abundant** due to technological advancement or capital availability

2. **Distribution becomes more valuable** as scarcity shifts from making things to moving things
3. **Governance authority concentrates** around those who control distribution infrastructure
4. **Producers operating exclusively at the production layer experience reduced leverage** as coordination layers capture surplus

This is not a moral judgment about fairness or exploitation. It is an economic observation about how value migrates when markets mature.

Ronald Coase's 1937 paper "The Nature of the Firm" argued that companies exist because markets are not frictionless. When the cost of transacting through open markets is high—due to search costs, negotiation complexity, or enforcement uncertainty—firms internalize coordination to reduce those costs.

Coordination layers reduce friction. Railroads reduced transportation friction. Pipelines reduced distribution friction. Broadcast networks reduced audience aggregation friction. Retail chains reduced consumer search friction.

Every reduction in friction increases participation. When participation increases, the value of coordination increases proportionally. Network effects amplify the dynamic: as more users join a coordination layer, the value of participating rises for everyone. This attracts more users. Switching costs increase. Governance authority strengthens.

This is what I call the **Compression to Concentration Cycle**:

- Production compresses (becomes easier, cheaper, more abundant)
- Coordination concentrates (becomes more valuable, more centralized)
- Control shifts upward (from producers to coordinators)

The internet dramatically accelerated this cycle rather than reversing it.

The Internet as Coordination Infrastructure

Search engines did not emerge to make information scarce. They emerged because information had become abundant to the point of overwhelming. When anyone could publish a website, the challenge shifted from production to discovery.

Google solved a coordination problem: how do you find relevant information in an ocean of content? The company built algorithmic infrastructure that ranked pages based on signals of authority and relevance. This service was extraordinarily valuable. Users could locate information in seconds rather than hours.

For publishers and businesses, search became the primary distribution channel. Ranking highly for relevant queries meant traffic. Traffic meant revenue. Entire industries formed around search engine optimization—the art and science of structuring content to rank well.

For years, this system appeared meritocratic. Produce authoritative content. Earn links from reputable sources. Structure pages correctly. Traffic followed. The correlation between quality and visibility seemed strong.

But the underlying structure was identical to previous coordination layers: ranking criteria were governed externally. Google controlled the algorithm. Updates could shift visibility overnight. Features like featured snippets and knowledge panels changed where users clicked. AI Overviews began synthesizing answers directly within search results, reducing the need to visit external websites.

The product—the content itself—did not degrade. The interface changed how value flowed. Search engines mediated more of the user

experience internally, capturing attention that previously flowed outward to publishers.

Social networks followed the same trajectory. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter initially distributed content chronologically. As user bases expanded and content volume exploded, algorithmic feeds became necessary to manage abundance. Organic reach declined as platforms prioritized engagement signals and paid placements.

Brands that had built large followings without converting them into owned relationships discovered that reach was conditional. It could be reduced algorithmically without explanation or recourse. The governance layer controlled distribution.

Again, production did not fail. The coordination layer tightened.

The Question That Matters

This brings us to the fundamental question that every producer—every company creating products, services, or content—must now answer:

Who controls your access to demand?

This question is uncomfortable because the honest answer is often external. A publisher may control editorial quality but not search ranking. A merchant may control product quality but not marketplace placement. A software developer may control feature development but not app store approval. A brand may control messaging but not social feed reach.

The product did not fail. Distribution governance determined exposure.

Understanding this shift requires abandoning a deeply held myth: that superior production guarantees durable success. This myth is psychologically comforting. It suggests that excellence is enough. Work hard, build something great, and the market will reward you.

But in markets where coordination layers govern access, excellence is necessary but not sufficient. Structural position matters more than isolated quality.

This realization is what drove me to write this book. After building and selling multiple companies—some successfully, some less so—I've seen this pattern repeat across industries and business models. I've experienced the false comfort of strong growth driven by a single distribution channel. I've felt the shock when that channel's governance changed. I've observed competitors with inferior products outperform because they controlled distribution.

The companies that endure are not always the ones that execute best. They are the ones that understand the architecture of access.

The Personal Inflection Point

Let me make this concrete with my own experience, because the theory becomes real when it hits your revenue dashboard.

From The Future, a digital services agency I built, grew rapidly by mastering organic search. We understood Google's ranking signals better than most. We structured content architecturally. We earned authoritative backlinks. We dominated competitive keywords in the digital marketing space. Traffic grew predictably. Client acquisition became a function of ranking position.

This felt like sustainable advantage. We were good at something valuable. The model worked.

Until it didn't.

Google's Helpful Content Update in September 2023 changed visibility patterns across thousands of sites that had built acquisition engines around informational content. Traffic that had been stable for years shifted within weeks. Rankings remained, but click-through rates

declined as search interfaces began synthesizing answers directly. The product—our expertise, our writing, our strategic thinking—had not degraded. The interface had changed how demand reached us.

Traffic Think Tank, the membership community I also built, proved more resilient. Why? Because it owned identity. Members paid for recurring access to a closed community. Discovery happened through referrals and direct relationships, not algorithmic mediation. When search volatility hit, TTT's revenue remained stable because it didn't depend on rented visibility.

The structural difference was obvious in hindsight: one business competed inside a coordination layer it didn't control. The other owned its demand pathway.

When I sold both businesses in 2023, this distinction shaped valuation conversations. Buyers understood dependency risk intuitively. A business deriving 70 percent of acquisition from one platform carries exposure. A business with diversified channels and recurring identity relationships commands a premium.

The product quality was never in question. The architecture determined value.

Why This Matters Now

You might reasonably ask: hasn't this pattern always existed? Didn't distribution always matter?

Yes. But three forces are accelerating the urgency right now:

First, artificial intelligence is compressing production costs across categories. Content generation, design iteration, code scaffolding, market research, customer service—functions that once required specialized teams can now be executed by small groups

using AI tools. The marginal cost of competent output is approaching zero in many domains.

When production becomes abundant, coordination becomes more valuable. When everyone can produce, inclusion becomes scarce.

Second, AI is simultaneously compressing visibility. Search engines are evolving from ranked lists to synthesized answers. Instead of presenting ten blue links, interfaces increasingly provide direct answers. The number of visible slots per query is shrinking. Inclusion probability is concentrating around central nodes in semantic networks.

Third, platform governance is accelerating. Software-mediated coordination layers can change rules, interfaces, and ranking criteria at global scale with minimal friction. What once took years to shift now happens in quarters. The velocity of governance evolution is increasing.

These forces compound. As production compresses and visibility compresses simultaneously, structural position becomes the decisive variable. The firms that control coordination layers will capture disproportionate value. The firms that operate inside those layers without insulation will experience volatility.

The product may remain excellent. The architecture will determine survival.

This is not a book about pessimism or decline. It is a book about clarity.

Markets evolve toward coordination concentration when production becomes abundant. This pattern has repeated across railroads, oil, broadcasting, retail, telecommunications, software, and now AI-mediated discovery. It is structural, not cyclical.

The companies that thrive in the next decade will not be those that simply execute better. They will be those that design structural

independence—that build their own gravity rather than relying entirely on rented visibility.

The product did not fail. It was never the primary lever.

The coordination layer always was.

The rest of this book will show you how to climb that ladder.

About the Author

Nick Eubanks is a serial founder with five exits who has lived both sides of the distribution dependency equation—and the transition between them.

As Founder and CEO of From The Future, a digital services agency, he built a business generating millions in revenue by mastering organic search. As Co-Founder of Traffic Think Tank, he created a membership community that owned its distribution through identity and recurring relationships. In 2023, he sold both companies—one to private equity, the other to Semrush (NYSE: SEMR)—and discovered that buyers valued them very differently based on a single variable: structural control over demand.

Following the acquisitions, Eubanks joined Semrush as VP of Owned Media, where he deployed capital to acquire, build, and scale owned assets that drove multiple seven figures in incremental monthly recurring revenue. The role crystallized a pattern he'd observed across his career: when platforms control discovery, they extract value. When you own the surface, you capture it.

The Last Moat emerged from that recognition. Eubanks watched AI compress the execution advantages he'd spent years building while simultaneously tightening the bottleneck around visibility. He saw firms with superior products become invisible because they lacked entity strength. He observed how dependency that felt manageable during growth became existential during compression.

His career arc—from optimizing within rented channels, to recognizing their fragility, to systematically building owned distribution infrastructure—maps directly onto the book's central argument: in an age of infinite execution, structural independence is not defensive strategy. It is the only strategy that compounds.



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